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During the last two decades, systemic banking crises have afflicted
developed and developing countries alike. A systemic crisis occurs
when widespread depositor runs reveal that most or all of the ac-
counting capital in a country’s banking system is illusory. Systemic
crisis have hit ninety-three countries, and borderline crises have af-
flicted forty-six countries. Numerous countries have suffered several
crises.
Banking crises are costly and disruptive. As measured by the
increased debt generated in the crisis year, fiscal costs incurred in
1997–98 crises exceeded 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)
in Thailand and Korea and 50 percent in Indonesia. The true cost of a
crisis, however, far exceeds its immediate fiscal cost. Severe banking
crises may derail macroeconomic stabilization programs, slow future
growth, and increase poverty. During a crisis, depositors typically
lose the use of their balances, and would-be borrowers and equity
issuers find that financial markets have dried up. Working-class and
retired households may be forced into a hand-to-mouth existence,
and good borrowers and sound banks may lose access to credit and be
forced into bankruptcy. Diminished confidence in domestic financial
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institutions may fuel a panicky flight of foreign and domestic capital
and a severe currency crisis.
To control these costs, policymakers erect a financial safety net.
The net seeks both to make a systemic financial breakdown less likely
and to limit the damage done when one occurs. Deposit insurance is
a critical component of such safety nets. Establishing explicit deposit
insurance guarantees has come to be seen as one of the pillars on
which any truly modern financial system must be built. Indeed, the
number of countries offering explicit deposit insurance has almost
tripled during the last decades. Today, most OECD countries and an
increasing number of developing countries feature explicit depositor
protection.
The popularity of explicit deposit insurance may give the mis-
leading impression that designing and operating an efficient system
is easy. Quite to the contrary, safety-net managers are assigned con-
flicting objectives that make their task very difficult. They are asked
not only to protect against financial crises and related economic shocks,
but also to avoid subsidizing bank risk-taking lest they foster ineffi-
cient bank risk-taking and other imprudent banking practices. The
central challenge safety-net managers face is to strike an appropriate
balance between preventing crises and at the same time controlling
bank risk-taking.
Given the difficulties involved in designing and operating a safety
net, policymakers often seek expert advice on how best to design an
explicit deposit insurance system. Expert advice needs to be grounded
in carefully interpreted cross-country empirical evidence. A recent
World Bank research project developed such a database for research-
ers worldwide and answered questions about how explicit deposit in-
surance affects four items: financial stability, how markets discipline
bank risk-taking, the development of the overall financial system,
and crisis management. This paper, which is based on Demirgüç-
Kunt and Kane (2002), provides a synthesis of this research effort.
The next section characterizes the dataset and uses it to summarize
the extent of cross-country differences in deposit insurance design.
Section 2 then summarizes the empirical evidence on the impact of
deposit insurance. Section 3 combines a short description of the Chil-
ean deposit insurance system with a list of features that cross-coun-
try research suggests that Chile should keep or alter. Section 4
concludes by restating our policy implications as principles.Deposit Insurance: Handle with Care 347
1. THE RISE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE AROUND THE WORLD
Deposit insurance can be explicit or merely implicit. Implicit in-
surance exists to the extent that the political incentives that shape a
government’s reaction to crisis make a taxpayer bailout of insolvent
banks seem inevitable. Explicit deposit insurance has spread rapidly
in recent years. The number of countries offering explicit deposit
guarantees surged from twelve in 1974 to seventy-one in 1999 (see
figure 1). Establishing explicit deposit insurance has become a princi-
pal feature of policy advice on financial architecture that outside ex-
perts give to countries undergoing reform (Folkerts-Landau and
Lindgren, 1998; García, 1999).
It is not hard to see why deposit insurance appeals to policymakers.
In the short run, government accountants can book income from pe-
riodic insurance premiums without acknowledging the parallel buildup
of formal obligations that guarantees create. Such one-sided account-
ing paints deposit insurance as a costless way of reducing the threat
of bank runs. Other attractions include protecting small depositors
and improving opportunities for small domestic banks to compete
with larger national and foreign institutions. In programs of
privatization or post-crisis restructuring, explicit deposit insurance
is sometimes adopted to curtail the size of implicit guarantees. When
banks were previously either government-owned or given blanket
guarantees, limiting the maximum size of balances covered by de-
posit insurance is an important goal.
Figure 1. Deposit Insurance around the World, 1935 to 1999
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A cross-country database developed as part of the World Bank
research program characterizes deposit insurance arrangements in
178 countries (Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci, 2001). This database docu-
ments how widely deposit insurance design varies across countries.
For example, account coverage varies from unlimited guarantees to
tight coverage limits. Japan, Mexico, and Turkey promise 100 per-
cent depositor coverage, whereas countries like Chile, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom cover individual deposits up to an amount
that is actually less than their per capita GDP. Also, although many
countries cover deposits denominated in foreign currency, most
schemes exclude interbank deposits. Besides setting a maximum level
of coverage, some countries insist that accountholders coinsure a
proportion of their deposit balances. Coinsurance provisions are still
relatively rare, but they are increasingly  frequent in recently adopted
schemes.
Deposit insurance obligations are typically advance-funded, most
commonly from a blend of government and bank sources. To allow
the insurer to build and maintain an appropriate fund of reserves
against its loss exposures, such countries generally assess their banks
an annual premium that is based entirely or in large part on the
amount of insured deposits. Efforts to make these annual premiums
sensitive to bank risk exposure have begun in recent years.
Insurance schemes are typically managed in a government agency
or in a public-private partnership. A few countries, such as Argen-
tina, Germany, and Switzerland, manage their schemes privately.
Finally, membership is compulsory for chartered banks in almost all
countries; the most notable exception is Switzerland.
Table 1 lists countries that either established or extensively re-
vised their deposit insurance scheme during the second half of the
1990s. A number of countries adopted or expanded their deposit in-
surance scheme as a crisis-management measure. For example, Ko-
rea, Malaysia, and Thailand moved to blanket coverage in response to
their recent crises. The 1990s saw a rapid spread in transitional coun-
tries—perhaps partly motivated by their long-term interest in joining
the European Union—and in some African countries. Countries that
adopted deposit insurance in 1999 are Ecuador, El Salvador, and mem-
bers of the Central African Currency Union, namely, Cameroon, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Republic
of Congo. Most of these new schemes show generous coverage levels.
For example, Central African Republic and Chad offer coverage ratios
that lie between 13 and 15 times their per capita GDP.Deposit Insurance: Handle with Care 349
Precisely because the range of design features is so extensive,
this dataset can permit analysts to compare and contrast how well
different features work in different circumstances. In the next sec-
tion, we summarize the implications of research that uses this data-
base to make inferences about key deposit insurance issues.
2. DEPOSIT INSURANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
An extensive theoretical literature analyzes the benefits and costs
of deposit insurance and explores the challenge of balancing these
benefits and costs to produce an optimal deposit insurance system.
This literature has been summarized by Kane (2000), Calomiris (1996),
and others.
Cross-country empirical evidence on the efficiency of real-world
deposit insurance systems is harder to come by. We begin this sec-
tion by posing four empirical questions whose answers indicate how
effective an individual country’s deposit insurance system happens to
be. Specifically, how does deposit insurance affect bank stability? How
does deposit insurance affect market discipline? How does deposit
insurance impact financial development? What role does deposit in-
surance play in managing crises?
2.1 Deposit Insurance and Bank Stability
Economic theory offers a mixed message on how deposit insur-
ance affects banking stability. On the one hand, credible deposit in-
surance contributes to financial stability by making depositor runs
less likely. On the other hand, unless insured institutions’ capital
Year adopted Countries that have established an explicit scheme
1999 Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ecuador,
       El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo
1998 Estonia, Gibraltar, Indonesiaa, Jamaica, Latvia, Malaysiaa, Ukraine
1997 Croatia, Thailanda
1996 Korea, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovak Republic, Sweden
1995 Brazil, Bulgaria, Oman, Poland
Table 1. Recent Establishment of Deposit Insurance Schemes
Source: Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci (2001).
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positions and risk-taking are supervised carefully, the insurer will
accrue loss exposures that undermine bank stability in the long run.
Economists label insurance-induced risk-taking as moral hazard. Moral
hazard occurs because sheltering risk-takers from the negative con-
sequences of their behavior increases their appetite for risk. The need
to control moral hazard in banking has been emphasized by academ-
ics, but dismissed or denigrated by many policymakers.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2003) are the first to use the
cross-county database to study the link between deposit insurance
and financial crises. They use data from sixty-one countries for the
period 1980–97 to estimate a model of banking crisis. After control-
ling for other determinants, they find that the presence of poorly
designed explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the likelihood
that a country will experience a banking crisis; they show that this
result does not appear to be driven by reverse causality.1 On investi-
gating individual design features, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache
also show that deposit insurance causes the most trouble in coun-
tries where coverage is extensive, where authorities amass a large
fund of explicit reserves and earmark it for insolvency resolution,
and where the scheme is administered by government officials rather
than the private sector. Finally, they also show that the contribution
of deposit insurance to bank fragility is significant in countries where
the institutional environment is underdeveloped, but it is not signifi-
cant in countries whose environment is strong. These findings sup-
port the hypothesis that where the contracting environment controls
incentive conflict, effective prudential regulation and supervision can
offset the adverse incentives created by deposit insurance so that
moral hazard need not be worrisome.
2.2 Deposit Insurance and Market Discipline
In environments characterized by a high degree of transparency,
depositors can discipline banks that engage in excessive risk-taking
1. The countries that introduce deposit insurance as a result of a crisis do not
drive these results, because observations for the crisis period are dropped from
the sample. As further evidence on this point, the authors go on to estimate a two-
stage model where they first estimate the probability of adopting explicit deposit
insurance and employ this estimated variable in a second-stage crisis equation.
The first-stage results indicate that countries in the sample decide to adopt deposit
insurance because other countries adopt it, as it becomes perceived to be best
practice. In the second stage, deposit insurance variables become even more signifi-
cant, indicating that allowing for potential endogeneity does not alter the results.Deposit Insurance: Handle with Care 351
by demanding higher deposit interest rates or by withdrawing their
deposits. However, to the extent that deposit insurance reduces the
stake that depositors have in monitoring and policing bank capital
and loss exposures, it shifts responsibility for controlling bank risk-
taking to the regulatory system. Bank performance is undermined
wherever deposit insurance managers displace more discipline than
they exert.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003) build a bank-level dataset cov-
ering forty-three countries over 1990–97, which they use to study de-
positor discipline by looking at interest rates and deposit growth. The
evidence shows that explicit insurance lowers banks’ interest expenses
and makes interest payments less sensitive to bank liquidity. How-
ever, regardless of the character of a country’s safety net, some mar-
ket discipline survives. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga also focus on
how variation in design characteristics affect market discipline. They
find that market discipline is stronger in countries with higher levels
of institutional development. Nevertheless, badly designed deposit
insurance curtails market discipline even in countries whose institu-
tional development is strong. Setting higher coverage limits, extend-
ing coverage to interbank deposits, establishing an ex ante fund of
reserves, funding reserves from government sources, and insisting
on public management each displaces market discipline. On the other
hand, market discipline is enhanced by coinsurance provisions, cov-
ering foreign currency deposits, and establishing private or joint
management of the insurance enterprise.
Such individual-bank data provide direct evidence of the way in
which deposit insurance design can affect bank risk-taking incentives.
Although deposit insurance displaces market discipline even in ad-
vanced countries, the net effect may be improved by strong regula-
tion and supervision. These findings reinforce the evidence on deposit
insurance and banking crises and accord with cross-country variation
in the risk-shifting incentives that one can infer from bank stock
prices (Hovakimian, Kane, and Laeven, 2003). Countries with poor
contracting environments are apt to suffer adverse consequences from
deposit insurance.
2.3 Deposit Insurance and Financial Development
Countries adopt deposit insurance for different reasons. One com-
mon goal, however, is to augment the flow of bank credit by increas-
ing the confidence that the general public has in the formal banking352 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Edward J. Kane
system and to do this without having to explicitly set aside or expend
current fiscal resources. To the extent that deposit insurance bol-
sters depositors’ faith in the stability of the banking system, it may
mobilize household savings for use by the financial system. Earlier
research shows that financial development supports improved pat-
terns of real investment and leads to sustainably higher aggregate
economic growth (Levine, 1997).
Recent adopters of deposit insurance include African and Latin
American countries with low levels of financial development. To in-
vestigate whether and how explicit deposit insurance contributes to
financial development, Cull, Senbet, and Sorge (2003) examine time-
series data for fifty-eight countries. These authors find that explicit
deposit insurance has a favorable impact on the level of financial ac-
tivity and its volatility only in the presence of strong institutional
development. In institutionally weak environments, deposit insur-
ance appears to distort the pattern of real investment and to retard,
rather than promote, financial development.
2.4 Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management
It is common practice to issue blanket guarantees to arrest a
banking crisis. Countries that have adopted this strategy include
Sweden (1992), Japan (1996), Thailand (1997), Korea (1997), Malaysia
(1998), and Indonesia (1998). More recently, Turkey tried to halt its
financial panic by guaranteeing not just bank depositors, but all do-
mestic and foreign nondeposit creditors of Turkish banks. Advocates
of using blanket guarantees to halt a systemic crisis argue that sweep-
ing guarantees can be helpful, even essential, in halting depositors’
flight to quality. However, because blanket guarantees create an expec-
tation of their future use in similar circumstances, they undermine
market discipline and may prove greatly destabilizing over longer
periods. Although some countries have managed to scale back formal
insurance coverage once a crisis has receded, it is very difficult to
scale back informal coverage in a credible manner.
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) analyze the impact of blanket guar-
antees and other crisis-management strategies on the ultimate fiscal
cost of resolving banking-system distress. Data covering forty crises
around the world indicate that unlimited depositor guarantees, open-
ended liquidity support, and regulatory forbearance significantly in-
crease the ultimate fiscal cost of resolving a banking crisis. Moreover,Deposit Insurance: Handle with Care 353
these authors find no trade-off between fiscal costs and the speed of
economic recovery. In their sample, depositor guarantees and regu-
latory forbearance failed to significantly reduce either crisis duration
or the crisis-induced decline in aggregate real output. Providing li-
quidity support for insolvent institutions appears to prolong a crisis
by destabilizing bank-lending incentives so extensively that healthy
adjustments are delayed and additional output loss is generated.
3. LESSONS FOR CHILE
Deposit insurance was established in Chile in 1986. The system
does not have a permanent fund in place. The Central Bank of Chile
will honor 100 percent of demand deposits, conditional on a favorable
report from the Superintendence regarding the justification for sub-
mission of payout proposals to the insolvent bank. Additionally, the
Chilean government guarantees 90 percent of household savings and
time deposits up to UF120 per individual. To limit the Central Bank’s
exposure, banks with demand deposits in excess of 2.5 times the capi-
tal reserves are required to maintain 100 percent reserves at the Cen-
tral Bank in short-term central bank or government securities. Foreign
exchange deposits are covered, but coverage excludes interbank de-
posits. Membership is compulsory for all banks, and the scheme is
publicly administered.
Two features of the Chilean economy must be highlighted before
we can discuss the implications of our research for Chile. First, within
the universe of developing countries, Chile has a highly advanced
level of institutional development. For example, on a six-point scale
measuring adherence to the rule of law, Chile scores a five. This
means that Chile’s citizens trust its legal system. On an index mea-
suring the protection of property rights, Chile obtains the highest
possible score of five. Government corruption is among the lowest in
the developing world: Chile scores a four on a six-point scale in which
higher scores indicate an absence of corruption.2 This profile makes
it reasonable to rate the Chilean institutional environment as strong
enough to support an explicit deposit insurance system whose design
can keep moral hazard in check.
2. The U.S. corruption index is also four. Indices for corruption and rule of law
are produced by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and the index for
property rights is produced by the Heritage Foundation.354 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Edward J. Kane
Second, Chile has a very concentrated banking system. Its top
five banks hold 71 percent of domestic banking assets. Concentrated
banking systems experience fewer systemic banking crises (Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2003) and almost always generate a high
level of implicit insurance coverage, partly because of “too big to fail”
pressures. Not surprisingly, empirical evidence confirms that incre-
mental exposure to moral hazard from introducing an explicit insur-
ance system is limited in highly concentrated environments.
Taken together, Chile’s institutional development and banking
concentration promise to limit any adverse impact that explicit de-
posit insurance might have on the Chilean economy. Still, the better
the design, the more efficiently the country’s scarce savings will be
allocated.
Research on the design of deposit insurance has some clear impli-
cations for Chile. First, with regard to coverage, it is important to set
enforceable limits so as to provide depositors and other creditors with
strong incentives to monitor bank risk-taking. For this reason, Chile
is to be complimented for keeping the coverage of term deposits low
(coverage is currently less than per capita GDP), for imposing coin-
surance so that each depositor is responsible for losses on the first 10
percent of its deposits, and for denying coverage to interbank depos-
its. These features strengthen private monitoring. The system would
be even stronger, however, if demand deposits were not fully cov-
ered. Although the Central Bank limits its loss exposure on these
deposits by imposing 100 percent reserve requirements above a speci-
fied size limit, a massive shift from time deposits to demand deposits
could occur in the event of a financial crisis. Such a shift would effec-
tively transmit full coverage to all depositors. Given that only 30 per-
cent of total deposits is currently covered by insurance, sudden shifts
could generate large increases in coverage at the worst possible time.
A potential solution would be to impose a strict coverage limit on
demand deposits.
A second positive feature is that the insurer has no explicit reserve
fund. Research indicates that earmarking large amounts of funds for
insolvency resolution distorts the incentives of market participants.
However, making the Central Bank of Chile the only party responsible
for covering losses from insolvencies is a dangerous feature. Unless the
insured banks truly expect to pay for their mistakes, they have very
little incentive either to curb their own excessive risk taking or to moni-
tor one another. If, instead, authorities made it clear that funds to cover
bank losses would come from surviving banks, Chilean banks couldDeposit Insurance: Handle with Care 355
monitor one another effectively, since the banking system is concen-
trated and the quality and quantity of information are very high. This is
a second improvement that could be introduced into the system.
Third, the Chilean system wisely insists on compulsory member-
ship. Compulsory membership is advisable since it allows risk pool-
ing and prevents stronger members from abandoning the scheme.
Finally, Chile has opted to let government officials run the de-
posit insurance system. Research  indicates, however, that enlisting
some layers of private management promises to improve system per-
formance. Private parties tend to be better at monitoring loss expo-
sures and initiating loss-control efforts in a timely manner.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Cross-country evidence is disturbing because, unlike Chile, many
of the countries that have recently installed explicit insurance have
poor contracting environments. What makes this research timely is
that 60 percent of the countries in the world still have not adopted
explicit deposit insurance. In Africa, for example, where the institu-
tional environment is the least developed, only nine of the continent’s
more than fifty countries offer explicit insurance.
Cross-country empirical research indicates that, for now, officials
in many countries would do well to resist the siren call of explicit
deposit insurance. Explicit insurance must be handled with care be-
cause it reduces the incentive for depositors to monitor the riskiness
of their banks. Studies show that in institutionally weak environ-
ments, deposit insurance design is apt to be defective, intensifying
rather than reducing the probability and depth of future crises. Un-
less the insurer can effectively replace the monitoring that its guar-
antees displace, formal guarantees tend to encourage excessive
risk-taking. Banks can raise funds from depositors at interest rates
that are much lower than the yields at which their high-risk loan
portfolios deserve to be funded. Depositors are apt to tolerate aggres-
sive bank lending as long as they remain secure in the knowledge
that whether or not bank loans pay off, their claims to repayment are
protected by credible deposit insurance.
Explicit insurance can only help develop a robust financial system
when the insurance scheme is well designed and when the local con-
tracting environment embodies reliable institutions of loss control.
The difficulty is one of sequencing. In a country with weak controls,356 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Edward J. Kane
explicit deposit insurance can, at best, spur financial development only
in the very short run. Formal guarantees undermine longstanding
patterns of bank bonding and depositor discipline. Over longer periods,
the loss of private discipline is likely to reduce bank solvency, destroy
real economic capital, increase financial fragility, and deter financial
development.
For countries that have already installed or are in the process of
designing an explicit deposit insurance scheme, cross-country empiri-
cal research identifies four principles of good design. No government
can afford to neglect these principles. No matter how strong a country’s
institutional environment might be, weaknesses in deposit insurance
design fuel financial fragility by undermining the discipline that banks
receive from private parties. The following four design features have
proved useful in controlling and offsetting these effects.
The most straightforward of these principles of good design en-
tails setting enforceable coverage limits. The goal is to ensure that
private monitoring complements official supervision: to convince large
depositors, subordinated debt holders, and correspondent banks that
their funds are truly and inescapably at risk. Providing strong incen-
tives for private parties to bond and police bank risk exposures is
critically important in contracting environments in which govern-
ment policing threatens to be deficient.
A second principle is to make membership in the deposit insur-
ance system compulsory. This increases the size of the insurance
pool and prevents strong institutions from selecting out of the sys-
tem when it needs to be recapitalized.
A third principle supported by cross-country evidence is to make
the public and private sectors jointly responsible for overseeing the
scheme. A public-private partnership establishes checks and balances
that improve management performance.
The fourth and final principle is to limit the fund’s ability to shift
its losses to the general taxpayer. Regardless of whether the insurer
holds a formal fund of reserves, it must be made clear that funds to
cover bank losses will come principally from surviving banks, except
in the most extreme circumstances. Taxpayer assistance should be
expected only in the special case of a profound crisis.
Deposit insurance is neither always good nor always bad. De-
pending on its design, it can be a useful part of a country’s overall
system of bank regulation and financial markets. Cross-country re-
search by no means implies that every country with an explicit sys-
tem should close it down at the first opportunity. Rather, the researchDeposit Insurance: Handle with Care 357
stresses the importance of identifying and fostering informative ac-
counting standards and reliable procedures for contract enforcement
before adopting deposit insurance. It also underscores the importance
of planning to intelligently re-adapt the insurer’s loss-control system
to close loopholes opened by financial innovation. Like any strong
medicine, users must ensure that the side effects of the prescription
are not worse than the course of the disease they intend to treat.358 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Edward J. Kane
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